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INTRODUCTION

In April 2019, Xiaoqing Zheng was indicted on charges of economic
espionage and conspiracy to steal trade secrets.1 Zheng was employed at a
General Electric (³GE´) location in New York as an engineer.2 His work focused
on turbine sealing technology.3 In late 2017, GE discovered multiple encrypted
files on Zheng¶s computer.4 The encryption was achieved via a program not
offered by GE to its employees.5 GE then began monitoring Zheng¶s activities
on its systems in an effort to discern what he was encrypting and what he was
doing with the encrypted information.6 Through this monitoring, GE discovered
that Zheng stole roughly 40 files with encrypted information relating to turbine
technology.7 Zheng then sent these files to a business partner in China who,
together with Zheng, used the research to develop and produce parts for
turbines.8 The two exchanged messages discussing the funding they could
receive from the Thousand Talents Program, a program launched by the Chinese
government with the stated goal of bringing Chinese citizens who have achieved
success in research and academia overseas back to China.9
Only a few months later, in July 2019, a federal jury in Washington,
D.C., convicted Shan Shi of conspiracy to commit theft of trade secrets.10 Shi
worked for a Houston, Texas-based company that researches and develops
syntactic foam, a material essential for deep-sea oil drilling.11 Shi was also

2
3
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1
Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Former GE Engineer and
Chinese Businessman Charged with Economic Espionage and Theft of GE¶s Trade Secrets (Apr.
23, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-ge-engineer-and-chinese-businessman-chargedeconomic-espionage-and-theft-ge-s-trade [hereinafter Former GE Engineer].

Id.
Id.

4
Indictment at 7, United States v. Xiaoqing Zheng, No. 1:19-CR-156(MAD), 2019 WL
2290758 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 2019).
5
6
7
8

Id.
Id.
Id.
Former GE Engineer, supra note 1.

9

Jim Stronski, China’s Economic Aggression Through the Acquisition (or Theft) of Foreign
IP and DOJ’s China Initiative, FORDHAM IP INST. 3 (2019), http://fordhamipinstitute.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/04/Stronski-Jim-China%E2%80%99s-Economic-Aggression-Through-theAcquisition-or-Theft-of-Foreign-IP-and-DOJ%E2%80%99s-China-Initiative-1.pdf.
10
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Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Texas Man Convicted of
Conspiracy
to
Commit
Theft
of
Trade
Secrets
(July
29,
2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/texas-man-convicted-conspiracy-commit-theft-trade-secrets.
11
Id.
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involved with the Thousand Talents Program.12 Shi opened his own business in
which he recruited ex-employees of the Houston company.13 These exemployees had access to trade secrets from the Houston company, which they
shared with Shi.14 Shi then used that information to create the same syntactic
foam in China. ³The defendant knew or intended that the offense would benefit
the People¶s Republic of China.´15
These cases are two very recent examples of economic espionage
perpetuated by the Chinese government, a practice FBI Director Christopher
Wray characterizes as a threat to the 8QLWHG6WDWHV¶national security.16 However,
this threat not only exists for the United States; Australia and Canada also see
the effects of the Thousand Talents Program. In August, the Canadian Security
Intelligence Service released a warning to universities and their researchers
against the Chinese government¶s attempts to use research programs to entice
academics, scientists, and researchers to bring economic and military advantages
to China.17 One Australian reporter noted a number of connections between
Australian recruits and the Thousand Talents Program, including one who
opened a laboratory and an artificial intelligence company in China that was later
funded by a Thousand Talents connection and a number of senior scientists who
participated in the Program.18
Further, while the state-sponsored economic espionage concerns posed
by the Chinese government through the Thousand Talents Program are one major
concern, these efforts are not perpetrated exclusively by China. At least two
recent cases have involved similar efforts sponsored by the Russian government.
The first case involved a team of hackers who stole trade secrets and other
information pertaining to the ³accounts of Russian journalists; Russian and U.S.
government officials; employees of a prominent Russian cybersecurity company;
43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 170 Side A

12
Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, The Threat Posed by the
Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of
the United States (July 7, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-thechinese-government-and-the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-securityof-the-united-states [hereinafter Threat Posed].
13
Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, American Businessman Who
Ran Houston-Based Subsidiary of Chinese Company Sentenced to Prison for Theft of Trade
Secrets (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/american-businessman-who-ran-houstonbased-subsidiary-chinese-company-sentenced-prison-theft.
14
Id.
15
16

Id.
Threat Posed, supra note 12.

17
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True North Wire, China Luring Canadian Scientists for Economic, Military Advantage:
CSIS, TRUE NORTH (Aug. 8, 2020), https://tnc.news/2020/08/08/china-luring-canadian-scientistsfor-economic-military-advantage-csis/.
18
Alex Joske, Hunting the Phoenix: The Chinese Communist Party’s Global Search for
Technology and Talent, AUSTL. STRATEGIC POL¶Y INST. (Aug. 20, 2020),
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/hunting-phoenix.
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and numerous´ others from Yahoo.19 In a second case, a defense contractor
working on commercial and military satellites stole trade secrets pertaining to
military satellites.20 He believed he was providing the information to an ³agent
of the Russian government, when in fact that person was an undercover employee
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.´21
Considering that situations like those discussed above continue to occur
and mount a growing concern for national security in the United States, it is
necessary to define economic espionage and the threat it poses. The FBI defines
economic espionage as ³foreign power-sponsored or coordinated intelligence
activity directed at the U.S. government or U.S. corporations, establishments, or
persons, designed to unlawfully or clandestinely influence sensitive economic
policy decisions or to unlawfully obtain sensitive financial, trade, or economic
policy information; proprietary economic information; or critical
technologies.´22 The Economic Espionage Act criminalizes the taking, copying,
or receiving of a trade secret.23 While merely taking, copying, or receiving a trade
secret for one¶s own economic benefit comprises the crime of theft of trade
secrets,24 to do so for the benefit of a foreign government can result in an
indictment and subsequent criminal conviction of economic espionage.25
The threat of state-sponsored economic espionage is a far-reaching one,
affecting individuals, corporations, and the nation as a whole. The FBI has
included the threat posed by economic espionage efforts ³as one of the seven
National Security Threat List issues on which limited counterintelligence assets
will be focused´ because of the threat to national security it poses.26 One of the
goals of foreign entities engaging in economic espionage efforts is to become
more competitive in the global market.27 By gaining access to trade secrets held
by United States businesses and using those secrets to develop their own
materials and technologies, foreign entities make massive gains in the market
without spending large amounts of time and money on research expenditures.28

Indictment at 2, United States v. Dokuchaev, No. CR-17-103 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2017).

20

Criminal Complaint at 7, United States v. Justice, No. 16-1357M (C.D. Cal. Jul. 1, 2016).
Id.

21
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19

22
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
What
Is
Economic
Espionage?
https://www.fbi.gov/about/faqs/what-is-economic-espionage (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
23
24

18 U.S.C.A. § 1831 (West 2021).
Id. § 1832.

25

27
28

Id.
Id.
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Id. § 1831; CHARLES DOYLE, STEALING TRADE SECRETS AND ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE: AN
OVERVIEW
OF
THE
ECONOMIC
ESPIONAGE
ACT
10
(Aug.
19,
2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R42681.pdf.
26
OPERATIONS SECURITY INTELLIGENCE THREAT HANDBOOK, ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
COLLECTION
DIRECTED
AGAINST
THE
UNITED
STATES
(2016),
https://fas.org/irp/nsa/ioss/threat96/part05.htm.
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This takes the competitive edge away from United States developers and
manufacturers, effectively lowering the market value of these productions and
affecting the economic security of the United States.29 Perhaps an even greater
danger is posed when the stolen research and information relates to military
technologies. Often, information stolen has both civilian and military uses. 30
Take, for example, the syntactic foam in Shan Shi¶s case; while the foam was
primarily used for deep-sea drilling, it also had uses in military submarines.31
Thus, through theft of this information, not only was the economic security of
the United States compromised but the national security as well.
While the problems surrounding state-sponsored economic espionage
efforts are numerous, perhaps the greatest challenge is in the lack of laws
pertaining to the subject on the international stage. The best avenue for righting
the wrong of state-sponsored economic espionage is through the use of an
international treaty that binds its member countries to a commitment to cease
economic espionage efforts. This Note will first consider, in Section II, domestic
laws pertaining to state-sponsored economic espionage. However, because state
actors are often involved, attempts at recourse stemming from domestic sources
frequently fail to adequately curtail economic espionage behavior. Then, in
Section III, this Note will consider the attempts²and the shortcomings thereof²
that have been made on the international stage to regulate and prevent the
practice of state-sponsored economic espionage. In Section IV, this Note will
provide historical evidence of the use of treaties to solve international problems,
including the shortcomings of such an approach. Finally, this Note will establish
that, despite the shortcomings that the use of a treaty may present, an
international treaty is still the best way to address the problem of economic
espionage.
II.

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 171 Side A

DOMESTIC DEFICIENCIES: WHY DOMESTIC LAW IS NOT AN
EFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE DILEMMA

The most prevalent domestic law aimed at economic espionage is the
Economic Espionage Act of 1996.32 It was enacted by Congress ³recognizing the
importance of the protection of intellectual property and trade secrets to the
economic health and security of the United States.´33 The Act sets out the
elements for two separate crimes. The theft of trade secrets is the more
complicated of the two offenses, requiring that the perpetrator act with ³the intent

29

Id.

30

Id.
Threat Posed, supra note 12.

31
32
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18 U.S.C.A. § 1831 (West 2021).
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Introduction to the Economic Espionage Act, CRIM. RES. MANUAL
(Jun. 2015), https://www.justice.gov/archives/jm/criminal-resource-manual-1122-introductioneconomic-espionage-act.
33
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34

DOYLE, supra note 25, at 9; see generally, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1832.

35

18 U.S.C.A. § 1831; DOYLE, supra note 25, at 9.
DOYLE, supra note 25, at 9.

36
37
38
39

18 U.S.C.A. § 1837.
Id.
DOYLE, supra note 25, at 12.
Id.

41

E. De. Vattel, The Law of Nations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND COMMENTARY 551,
552 (West Publishing Co. 2014).
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to benefit someone other than the owner,´ the ³intent to injure the owner,´ and
the stolen trade secret must be ³related to or included in a product that is
produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce.´34 Conversely,
economic espionage requires only that the perpetrator steals a trade secret
intending or knowing that the trade secret will benefit a foreign entity.35
Additionally, economic espionage applies to all theft of trade secrets, not just
those in interstate commerce.36
Because United States law traditionally only applies within the country¶s
borders, Congress included provisions in the Economic Espionage Act to extend
the Act¶s reach. Regardless of where the offense occurs, if a perpetrator of
economic espionage is ³a citizen or permanent resident alien of the United States,
or an organization organized under the laws of the United States or a State of
political subdivision thereof´ that perpetrator can be prosecuted under the
Economic Espionage Act.37 Additionally, even if the perpetrator does not have a
relationship to the United States that falls into one of these listed categories, if
the perpetrator commits ³an act in furtherance of the offense´ in the United
States, he or she may still be prosecuted under the Economic Espionage Act.38
However, even with these somewhat expansive extraterritoriality
provisions, the Economic Espionage Act is still limited in its reach. For instance,
if a perpetrator is not a United States citizen and conducts all trade secret theft
from outside the United States, a situation all too prevalent in the current age of
cyber capabilities, the Economic Espionage Act likely will not apply.39
Additionally, the Economic Espionage Act almost exclusively only allows for
the prosecution of individuals; where the acts are sponsored by the government
of another country, domestic laws such as the Economic Espionage Act are
unable to be applied.40
Even if the language of the Act itself did not preclude the United States
from prosecuting economic espionage in certain situations, the concepts of state
sovereignty and non-intervention likely would. Essentially, the concept of state
sovereignty means that countries all stand on equal footing and are their own
sovereigns.41 The principle of non-intervention provides that, because countries
are their own sovereigns, they are not subject to the laws or interferences of any
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other country except for where the first country consents.42 Therefore, based on
these principles, a country, such as China or Russia, cannot be hauled into court
and charged with the crime of economic espionage simply because the United
States has evidence that such a crime has been committed. When dealing with
state actors on the international scale, there must be an international law that
prohibits the conduct and provides an avenue to right the wrong of statesponsored economic espionage.
III.

INTERNATIONAL INADEQUACIES: HOW CURRENT INTERNATIONAL
LAW MECHANISMS FAIL TO ALLOW COUNTRIES TO BE HELD
ACCOUNTABLE FOR SPONSORING ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE

This section will discuss the flaws in various methods for dealing with
state-sponsored economic espionage. This section will first discuss three
questions that must be answered in order to determine whether state-sponsored
espionage falls under Article 10bis of the Paris Convention for industrial
property. After examining these steps, this section will discuss other avenues for
countries who have fallen victim to state-sponsored espionage, such as the World
Trade Organization and the China Cyber Agreement.
A. Article 10bis of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Property

42

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 172 Side A

One potential international mechanism to combat state-sponsored
economic espionage practices is through the invocation of unfair competition
provisions. One such provision is Article 10bis of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property (³the Article´), which states that ³the countries
of the Union are ³bound to assure to nationals of such countries effective
protection against unfair competition.´43 Under the Article, any act that
comprises a dishonest practice in industrial or commercial practices is an act of
unfair competition.44
In determining whether state-sponsored economic espionage falls under
the Article, however, Senior Lecturer in International Law Russell Buchan sets
out three questions that must be answered. First, it is necessary to determine
whether state-sponsored economic espionage is an act of competition within the
Article.45 In answering this question, Buchan invokes the purpose of the Paris

Id.

43

44
45

Buchan, supra note 43.
Id.
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Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, art. 10bis Sept. 28, 1979, 21
U.S.T. 483, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, 21 U.S.T. 1583w; Russell Buchan, Economic Espionage under
International Law, EJIL:TALK! (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.ejiltalk.org/economic-espionageunder-international-law/.
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Convention as a whole, ³which is to prevent unfair competition . . . generally.´46
Thus, state-sponsored economic espionage is an act of competition because it
disadvantages the owner of the trade secrets whose information has been stolen.47
The second question Buchan raises is whether this act of competition is an unfair
one.48 Because the Article proscribes dishonest practices, and theft is nothing if
not a dishonest practice, state-sponsored economic espionage is patently an
unfair act.49 Having reached the conclusion that state-sponsored economic
espionage is an unfair act of competition, Buchan raises the question of whether
the Article obliges extraterritorial implementation.50 Buchan argues that because
States are required to ³assure to nationals of [countries party to the Convention]
effective protection against unfair competition,´ the Article¶s application is
based on the nationality of the victim, not the geographic location.51 However, it
would be too cumbersome to require countries to positively protect all nationals
of countries party to the Convention from unfair competition; instead, countries
are likely merely required only to refrain from engaging in economic espionage
that would constitute unfair competition themselves.52 This means that countries
are not required to, and remembering the principles of state sovereignty and nonintervention are likely not allowed to, intercede in the economic espionage
attempts of other countries.
B. The World Trade Organization

46

Id.

47

Id.
Id.

48
49
50
51
52
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Another avenue countries that have been victims of state-sponsored
economic espionage may explore involves World Trade Organization (³WTO´)
rules developed in the 1990s. Members of Congress argue that this is a viable
mechanism to impose civil consequences on China and other countries that
engage in economic espionage.53 A first issue that arises here, however, is that
WTO remedies are generally futuristic, meaning that the remedy is compensation
for ongoing harm once a case has succeeded, not harm that arose previously.54
This remedy often involves bringing the erring country into compliance with the
rules.55 This approach can be useful where a country has shown a historical

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

54
55

Id. at 839.
Id. at 840.
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53
Jamie Strawbridge, The Big Bluff: Obama, Cyber Economic Espionage, and the Threat of
WTO Litigation, 47 GEO. J. INT¶L L. 833, 837 (2016).
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pattern of behavior that warrants correction; however, where the victim country
seeks punitive results to curtail future behavior, or where the victim country can
only prove a few isolated incidents of state-sponsored economic espionage, this
option proves futile in meeting those goals.
The victim country could frame the state-sponsored economic espionage
as a pattern of behavior, encompassing both past incidents and future anticipated
ones and establishing a practice contrary to WTO rules.56 The difficulty here,
however, is that one WTO panel has opined that such a claim would not rise to
the level of a ³measure´ or a challengeable offense within WTO jurisprudence.57
Another panel, on the other hand, has posited that such a claim would be a viable
measure that could be challenged on an ³as such´ basis, a term used by the WTO
to describe laws, regulations, or other instruments that establish norms that have
general reach.58 An issue that arises with this approach, however, is that it
requires the victim country to identify and collect evidence of enough economic
espionage attempts, all sponsored by the country in question, to show a pattern
of behavior established enough to constitute a practice.59
C. The China Cyber Agreement

56
57
58

Id. at 843.
Id.
Id. at 841.
Id. at 842.

60

JOHN W. ROLLINS, SUSAN V. LAWRENCE, DIANNE E. RENNACK, & CATHERINE A. THEOHARY,
U.S.±CHINA CYBER AGREEMENT (2015) https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IN10376.pdf.
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A final option commonly pointed to in this field is the United StatesChina Cyber Agreement reached by Presidents Obama and Jinping in 2015. The
agreement obligates the two countries to provide timely access to information
regarding malicious cyber activities and abstain from performing or supporting
cyber-enabled intellectual property theft, among other things.60 While this was
undoubtedly a step in the right direction in reducing the impact of statesponsored economic espionage between the United States and China, there are
two major areas the agreement does not cover. First, the agreement exists only
between the United States and China and thus obligates no other countries to
disengage in economic espionage efforts. While one of the greatest concerns to
economic and national security in the United States currently is the Chinese
government, other concurrent and future concerns still exist. The second issue
here is that the agreement only relates to cyber economic espionage. It does not
proscribe old-fashioned economic espionage like that described in the two cases
at the beginning of this Note, where the perpetrators were physically present for
the theft.
Given that all three of these options for curtailing state-sponsored
economic espionage on the international scale leave large holes in which the
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practice can continue, it is necessary to address other ways in which statesponsored economic espionage can be dealt with legally. Historically, where
domestic law fails to adequately address an issue on the global stage, countries
have worked to enact treaties and other agreements that directly attack the
problem while still respecting the principle of state sovereignty by requiring the
consent of the countries party to the agreement. Such an agreement is what is
called for here. The remainder of this Note will address why historical evidence
leads to the conclusion that a treaty is the best option for addressing the issue of
state-sponsored economic espionage, what that treaty could entail, and how that
treaty would allow victim countries recourse against state-sponsored economic
espionage efforts.
IV.

HISTORICAL HARMONY: HOW TREATIES HAVE HISTORICALLY
BEEN USED TO ERADICATE THREATS BETWEEN STATES

61
Thomas Graham Jr., Avoiding the Tipping Point, ARMS CONTROL
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/BookReview (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
62

ASS¶N,

Id.
Id.

64

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729
U.N.T.S. 161.
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Historically, international agreements have been used to create pacts
between countries that pose dangers to each other. Examples exist in the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (³the Nuclear Weapons Treaty´),
the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling,
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (³the Chemical Weapons
Convention´), and the International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism (³the Terrorist Financing Convention´). Each of these
agreements arose out of an international recognition of a threat that a significant
number of countries were committed to decreasing and, eventually, eradicating.
Amidst the unrest of the Cold War, where fear of nuclear weapons
development and use was at its height, predictions existed of over 25 nuclearweapon States²those countries who possess nuclear weapons²in the next few
decades.61 The knowledge of how to create nuclear weapons was already in the
hands of a number of countries.62 If a wide range of countries had capitalized on
this knowledge and began creating nuclear weapons, they inevitably would have
ended up in the hands of terrorist organizations, rogue states, and other radical
groups.63 With this fear in mind, the Nuclear Weapons Treaty entered into force
in 1970, eventually binding 186 non-nuclear-weapon States in an agreement to
not transfer, manufacture, or receive nuclear weapons.64 The five nuclearweapon States in existence at the time agreed to not transfer existing nuclear
weapons and to not assist non-nuclear-weapon States in the development or
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acquisition of such weapons.65 All 191 countries agreed to submit to reviews by
the International Atomic Energy Agency (³IAEA´).66 These reviews serve the
purpose of ensuring that countries are honoring their obligations under the
Treaty.67
Initially, there was skepticism aimed at the Nuclear Weapons Treaty,
with some of the countries involved believing that others would not honor their
agreements under the Treaty.68 However, these fears did not come to fruition;
very little production of nuclear weapons has occurred since the entry of the
Nuclear Weapons Treaty into force.69 The massive success of the Treaty has
caused the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons to develop from a mere
agreement between countries into an international norm.70
Similar to the Nuclear Weapons Treaty, the Chemical Weapons
Convention was created with the goal of decreasing the use and possession of
chemical weapons by various countries.71 The Chemical Weapons Convention
entered into force in 1997.72 Acknowledging that the use of chemical weaponry
had, for thousands of years, been associated with cruelty and unfair play,
international countries came together to ban the use of chemical weapons in
battle.73 The wars of the twentieth century exacerbated the concerns surrounding
the use of chemical weapons; this culminated in negotiations on the Chemical
Weapons Convention.74
The Convention required that countries owning chemical weapons create
a plan for the destruction of those weapons within 30 days of the Convention¶s
entry into force.75 Pursuant to the Convention, the Organization for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (³OPCW´) inspects chemical weapons
facilities and activities in order to ensure that signatory countries are in
compliance with the Convention.76 If countries are found to not be in compliance,

66
67
68
69
70

Id.
Id.
Id.
GRAHAM, supra note 61.
Id.
Id.

71
Looking Back Helps Us Look Forward, ORG. FOR THE PROHIBITION
https://www.opcw.org/about/history (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
72
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the OPCW may recommend that other countries party to the Convention take
punitive action.77 In other instances, the OPCW may bring the infraction before
the U.N. Security Council78 and the General Assembly.79 With 193 signatories,80
the Convention is considered one of the most successful weapons disarmament
agreements in history, largely because of the oversight the OPCW maintains over
signatory countries.81
Countries have also come together to establish treaties aimed at the
economic aspects of threatening activities. In 1999, the Financing Terrorism
Convention was adopted.82 With the goals of ³maintenance of international peace
and security and the promotion of good-neighborliness and friendly relations and
cooperation among States,´83 and ³ensuring that there is a comprehensive legal
framework covering all aspects of the matter,´84 the countries party to the
Financing Terrorism Convention agreed that it was necessary to establish the
Convention to address the formerly unaddressed issue of the financing of
terrorism.85 The countries party to the Convention noted that there were no
existing multilateral agreements focused on the financing of terrorism and
recognized the ³urgent need to enhance international cooperation among States
in devising and adopting effective measures for the prevention of the financing
of terrorism, as well as for its suppression through the prosecution and
punishment of its perpetrators.´86 To date, there are 189 parties to the
Convention.87

77

Id.
The U.N. Security Council has four main purposes: maintaining international peace and
security, developing friendly relations among nations, cooperating in solving international
problems and in promoting respect for human rights, and being a center for harmonizing the actions
of nations. See United Nations Security Council, What is the Security Council?, UNITED NATIONS,
https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/what-security-council (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
78
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International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 1999,
2178 U.N.T.S. 197.
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The Nuclear Weapons Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and
the Financing Terrorism Convention all provide examples of international
agreements successfully addressing issues that pose a danger to countries on an
international scale. Next, it is necessary to evaluate why these agreements work.
A. The Issue Addressed Is One of Mutual Concern to the Countries
Involved

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 175 Side A

The idea of reciprocity is implicit in a number of international
agreements and negotiations. At its core, reciprocity is a term used to describe
situations where two parties provide equal assistance or advantage to each
other.88 Where all involved parties have interests that align perfectly, all parties
are able to trust that their fellows will act in a reciprocal manner, fulfilling all
obligations under the agreements to reach the common goal.89 Here, reciprocity
is nearly guaranteed; where interests are the same, and no individual party has
reason to defect, each party will act in kind with all others.90 However, this ideal
situation rarely exists in practice, yet the fundamental idea of reciprocity still
underscores a wide range of agreements.91
Where countries do not have overlapping interests, the temptation to
serve one¶s own interests at the expense of another¶s naturally arises.92 However,
the threat of non-reciprocal behavior often limits this temptation.93 Take, for
example, the Nuclear Weapons Treaty, which has the goal of confining nuclear
weapons to those countries who already own them and binding those countries
to an agreement not to employ the nuclear weapons they have.94 If Country A,
which does not own nuclear weapons, defects in its obligations by acquiring such
weapons from Country B, both Countries have now violated the Treaty. Country
C, which does own nuclear weapons, no longer has any reason to trust that
Countries A and B are committed to serving the common interest. Further,
Country C may choose to employ its own nuclear weapons against Countries A
and B to quell any forthcoming aggressive action. The theory of reciprocity rests

https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII11&chapter=18&clang=_en (last visited Oct. 16, 2021).
88
Shahrad Nasrolahi Fard, Is Reciprocity a Foundation of International Law or Whether
International Law Creates Reciprocity 10 (2013) (Ph.D. Thesis, Aberystwyth University) (on file
with author).
89
Francesco Paris & Nita Ghei, The Role of Reciprocity in International Law, 36 CORNELL
INT¶L L. J. 93, 95 (2003).
90
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Id. at 97.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
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in this threat, and it places a safeguard against countries acting in their own
interests to the detriment of others.
B. The Widespread Consent of Countries to the Agreements Makes the
Provisions Reflect a Norm of Behavior Within the International
Community

43709-wva_124-1 Sheet No. 175 Side B

Another key reason why agreements such as the Nuclear Weapons
Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Financing Terrorism
Convention work is, first, because they are consensual agreements and, second,
because they have attained such widespread consent that they now govern the
overwhelming majority of countries. In international law, where state
sovereignty remains a common impediment to all-encompassing standards,
consent allows countries to maintain their autonomy while still allowing the
international community to reach common goals.95
The agreements above, with between 189 and 193 parties each,
exemplify how important the role of consent is in international agreements.
Imagine that only 20 states had signed on to any of the three example agreements
given. The agreements, lacking consensual participation by so many countries,
would have had little efficacy, as they could not have been invoked against any
of the countries who did not sign onto them. But, because a majority of countries
did sign onto each agreement, they became three highly successful international
agreements.
The hypothetical above highlights the major role consent plays in
effectuating desires held by various countries. First, and most directly, the 191
parties to the Nuclear Weapons Treaty, the 193 parties to the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and the 189 parties to the Financing Terrorism Convention are all
consensually obligated to follow the provisions instituted by those agreements.96
The Financing Terrorism Convention, which came into being based on the
recognition by the countries party to it of an ³urgent need´ to address the growing
and previously unaddressed problem of financial contributions to the goals of
terrorism, highlights how countries can solve a problem of international
importance by, first, recognizing the problem and, second, consenting to
provisions that allow for the suppression of the problem. Especially in the case
of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which contains provisions allowing the
OPCW to act punitively in the face of non-compliance,97 countries have agreed,
by their own consent, to be bound into agreements not to act, sometimes in what
would appear to be a self-interested fashion, in a way that would violate these

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol124/iss1/11

14

C M
Y K

11/16/2021 08:40:42

95
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agreements and harm the collective community. Second, and perhaps less
directly, the consent of a large number of countries to an agreement provides a
sense of security and of commonality to other countries who have the same goals,
thus incentivizing further consensual agreement from those other countries.
C. The Oversight Provided for Within the Agreement Allows for
Enforcement of Provisions
Two of the example agreements provided, the Nuclear Weapons Treaty
and the Chemical Weapons Convention, have oversight committees that ensure
proper observance and implementation of the agreements within the signatory
countries. The IAEA provides oversight for countries who are parties to the
Nuclear Weapons Treaty, ensuring that those countries fulfill their obligations
under the Treaty. Likewise, the OPCE does the same for countries party to the
Chemical Weapons Convention. It is the oversight of these bodies that gives the
agreements enforcement, for if countries know they are subject to review, they
are much more likely to remain in compliance with the agreements and fulfill
their obligations under them.
V.

OPTIMISTIC OPTION: HOW THE THEMES OF RECIPROCITY,
CONSENT, AND OVERSIGHT CAN SOLVE THE PROBLEM OF STATESPONSORED ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE
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The threats posed by economic espionage mirror those that lead to the
entries into force of the Nuclear Weapons Treaty, the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and the Financing Terrorism Convention. Just as nuclear weapons,
biological warfare, and terrorism were considered the greatest threats of their
times, we have entered an age where the possibility of trade secret theft for
exploitation by non-friendly governments poses a risk to the economic wellbeing and national security of the nation.98 Just as the threats of nuclear and
chemical weaponry and terrorism were addressed via international agreements,
the threat posed by state-sponsored economic espionage should be as well, lest
countries find themselves soon in a position where they are unable to protect
their own trade secrets from each other.
The remainder of this Note will contemplate how a multilateral
economic espionage treaty, like the agreements previously discussed, would
employ the ideas of reciprocity, consent, normative behavior, and oversight to
effectively curtail the effects of state-sponsored economic espionage. This Note
will also examine the positives and negatives of using a multilateral treaty to
reach that end, eventually concluding that while any effort to decrease the threat

FEDERAL
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INVESTIGATION,
The
China
Threat,
https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/counterintelligence/the-china-threat (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
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of economic espionage is welcome, a treaty will most effectively address this
issue.
As Odeen Ishmael, a retired Guyanese diplomat, explains, ³[r]eciprocity
is a principle deeply rooted in the international arena and it allows to a large
extent the advance of diplomatic relations.´99 This is because an agreement that
requires multiple parties to set aside an advantage, as signing onto a treaty to
eradicate the use of state-sponsored economic espionage would, requires that
trust exist between the two parties. China is not likely to agree to a cessation of
the economic espionage efforts being promulgated by the Thousand Talents
Program if it believes the United States is propagating those same efforts on its
end in contravention of the proposed treaty. However, as Ishmael provides,
reciprocity is a profound principle in international law.100 Because of this, when
one country signs onto an international agreement, it does so with an expectation
that other countries party to the agreement will adhere to their obligations under
the agreement. This ³Golden Rule´ understanding between countries provides
an avenue for the issue of state-sponsored economic espionage to be addressed
in a way that allows perpetrators of state-sponsored economic espionage to cease
such efforts with the implicit guarantee that other countries will follow suit.
It must be emphasized that the theory of international relations
of reciprocity is considered an instrument for achieving the
development of relations of mutual trust and long-term mutual
obligations and an incentive for compliance with international
standards. Likewise, it is considered a fundamental principle for
the interaction of states to effectively manage crises.101
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Reciprocity does not only apply in dealings between two parties,
however.102 It is instead an expansive, multilateral theory that allows multiple
countries to deal with each other simultaneously while being subject to the same
standard of fair and mutual dealing across the board.103 In a treaty like the one
proposed by this Note, this is essential. For a treaty such as this to maintain force,
it must obtain a number of signatories, each of whom expects to be treated fairly
and evenly by all other signatories. Here, where countries such as the United
States, Canada, and Australia are experiencing the same threat of decreased
economic and national security as state-sponsored economic espionage efforts

99

Odeen Ishmael, Reciprocity in International Relations, NOTES ON DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE,
para.
3
https://odeenishmaeldiplomacy.wordpress.com/2013/08/19/41-reciprocity-ininternational-relations/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
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grow,104 the possibility of multilateral interest in a treaty that addresses this threat
is very real. This possibility only grows where the theory of reciprocity in
international dealings is acknowledged and respected.
Thus, reciprocity is essential in obtaining an agreement with the
attributes necessary to impede state-sponsored economic espionage efforts
globally. However, a mutual obligation of reciprocal dealings will not be enough
to significantly hinder state-sponsored economic espionage between the greatest
actors on the world stage. Consent of the involved countries party to a treaty
aimed at impeding state-sponsored economic espionage efforts and the
establishment of a norm against such economic espionage will contribute
drastically to the goal of ending the state-sponsored theft of trade secrets from
other countries.
If a treaty were to be made to address the state-sponsored economic
espionage concern, it would only have force, at least initially, with the consent
of the signatory countries to be subjected to its terms. However, consent is a
cornerstone of international law; so long as countries maintain their sovereignty,
they maintain their ability not to enter into agreements except for where they
actively agree to do so. If various countries were to sign onto a treaty proscribing
the use of state-sponsored economic espionage, like the one proposed by this
Note, those countries would be signifying three things. First, they would signify
their agreement that state-sponsored economic espionage, despite the obvious
advantages it provides countries individually, creates a danger that must be
eradicated if countries are to continue to prosper in their technological
developments.105 Second, when countries give their consent to such an
agreement, they legitimize the goals of the agreement.106 Finally, when a rule of
international law is created through the consent of countries, the likelihood of
those laws changing in the future decreases as the will to follow those laws
already exists.107
Consent by just two parties, or even by a small number of parties, is not
enough to curb this threat, however. It is necessary to have a vast majority of
countries to consent to a treaty disallowing the use of state-sponsored economic
espionage to gain unfair advantages over each other. It is again useful to define
the exact threat economic espionage poses. When trade secrets are stolen, those
effects are felt on both large and small scales. Individuals lose their jobs. On a
larger scale, businesses are closed. Billions of dollars in profits are lost when
trade secrets are stolen. This leads to unstable national economies, which, in the
globally connected world we live in, leads to unstable global economies. With
this threat in mind, it becomes clear why state-sponsored economic espionage is
True North Wire, supra note 17; Joske, supra note 18.
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not just dangerous to the single individual, business, or country targeted, but
instead to the global community. Thus, it is of mutual benefit for the majority of
countries to implement an economic espionage treaty.
Further, where a majority of countries do ascribe to a treaty, the rules
contained within that treaty become something more than contractual obligation;
they become a normative standard for behavior. That is the goal here: to
effectuate a treaty with such widespread consent that the prohibition against
state-sponsored economic espionage becomes the norm rather than an aspiration.
The relationship between the law and societal norms can most aptly be
characterized as cyclical.108 Laws are often written as a way to express preestablished norms in a standardized way, and as the laws take effect, the norms
of society conform further with the law.109 There is already a long-standing norm
against the interference in one country¶s internal activities by another country so
long as those activities do not violate an international law.110 However, a
multilateral treaty, agreed to by sovereign countries would go beyond
recognizing this norm by allowing countries to express in a written and lasting
format the prohibition against the use of economic espionage to infiltrate and
destabilize the economic and national security of other countries.
Finally, it is important to reiterate that a large amount of the Chemical
Weapons Convention¶s success is owed to the oversight body it establishes. Such
an oversight body would be needed in the proposed treaty to ensure that countries
party to it are following their obligations not to commence, perpetuate, or assist
in economic espionage. In the field of human rights, which is heavily addressed
by international agreements, treaty bodies are often comprised of experts tasked
with ensuring that the standards outlaid in international agreements are followed
by the signatories to those agreements.111 These oversight bodies are responsible
for the continuing success of agreements proscribing torture and various forms
of discrimination, as well as agreements ensuring the rights of children and
migrant workers.112
Based on these observations, a treaty aimed at eradicating the use of
state-sponsored economic espionage between countries would be based, like
most other international agreements, in the consent of the countries party to it.
This consent would rest in the theory of reciprocity serving as a guarantee of
mutual dealings between parties to a treaty. Finally, the treaty would need to
establish an oversight body to ensure that the parties are fulfilling their
obligations under the treaty.
108

Josef L. Kunz, Revolutionary Creation of Norms of International Law, 41 AM. J. INT¶L L.
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109
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VI.

TURNING OUT TREATIES: HOW TREATIES ARE MADE

113

International Agreements, U.S. DEP¶T OF HEALTH AND HUM.
https://www.phe.gov/s3/law/Pages/International.aspx (last visited Sept. 3, 2021).
114
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The process of creating a treaty begins with a negotiation. This
negotiation typically takes place via an organization created for the specific
purpose of negotiating that treaty, or by an international body that already exists,
such as a United Nations council.113 Representatives of the negotiating countries
engage in discussions²sometimes over a number of years²with the goal of
creating terms to the treaty that satisfy all or most of the negotiating parties.114
After negotiations, the representatives of the agreeing parties sign the treaty.115
From here, the process varies among different countries. For instance, in the
United States, the President must obtain the ³advice and consent´ of two-thirds
of the Senate before ratifying the treaty.116 In China, the governmental
department concerned with the treaty must work in conjunction with the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs to submit the proposed treaty to the State Council for
examination and verification.117 From there, the State Council submits the
proposed treaty to the Standing Committee of the National People¶s Congress
for a decision on whether to ratify the treaty.118 The President of China may only
ratify the proposed treaty with the consent of the Standing Committee.119
While this process seems simple, there are often background factors that
make it a lengthy and taxing process on the people involved. For example, in the
United States, a two-thirds vote of the Senate is required prior to ratifying a treaty
in order to inhibit the United States from entering into a treaty on purely partisan
lines.120 There are also foreign policy matters to take into consideration, such as
the amicability of the relationship between the countries negotiating and the
ability of those countries to actually implement the terms of the treaty.
Even with these barriers in mind, the process of treaty creation is a
relatively simple one that has been implemented numerous times over the course
of history to settle disputes of extreme international importance. Considering the
growing problem of state-sponsored economic espionage, and the recognition by
the United States of America of how pervasive this problem is, it is time for the

SERVS.,
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Id.

117
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he%20Standing (last visited Aug. 20, 2021).
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United States to begin the process of negotiating a treaty to impede and
eventually eradicate the practice of state-sponsored economic espionage.
VII.

CONCLUSION: AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY AS THE BEST OPTION
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One of the largest pros of implementing a multilateral treaty is that
treaties have been used for centuries to reach agreements between nations. They
are a practiced and historically effective method for eliminating problematic
behaviors and encouraging beneficial behaviors between countries. This is
because, first, of the consensual nature of treaties. Second, treaties legally bind
the parties.121 Third, countries that have signed onto a treaty must act in good
faith to avoid behavior that will defeat the purpose of the treaty.122
The benefits of the consensual nature of treaties have been discussed, but
it is worth while to reiterate that countries are more likely to uphold laws they
consent to be bound to. Additionally, a treaty based on mutual agreement by all
parties includes the theory of reciprocity, which requires parties to act in accord
with the actions of others.
Under international law, treaties are binding legal agreements.123 Once
countries sign on to them, they are bound by the terms within.124 Because of this,
treaties create an environment of accountability where countries are bound to act
in accordance with the agreement they¶ve signed and may face ramifications if
they fail to do so.
Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires
countries party to a treaty to ³refrain from acts which might defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty pending its entry into force.´125 This is especially
advantageous when dealing with a proposed treaty that may require some time
before gaining enough support to be entered into force. Article 18 means that
once a country signs onto a treaty, even before the treaty becomes complete and
binding by entry into force, that country signatory is required not to act against
the terms of the treaty. This allows for the goals of the treaty to be met in the
interim period between its being drafted and its entry into force.
The disadvantages of using a treaty to reach an agreement between
multiple countries include, mainly, that treaties are only binding on the countries
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which sign onto them.126 Countries practicing state-sponsored economic
espionage, especially countries doing so in a way that largely benefits their own
goals, are not going to want to sign a treaty that obligates them to cease their
economic espionage efforts. A single country, or even a small collection of
countries, neglecting to sign onto a treaty does not halt the progress of the treaty
in its tracks, however. The reality is that even treaty agreements that are not
unanimous can eventually come to represent a general principle of law with
widespread use, which supersedes the power of the countries to deny consent.
General principles of law are not as prevalent in international law as
treaties, but they are a very important source of law. A general principle is
established when a vast number of countries, with varying legal systems, observe
the principle as law domestically.127 General principles may be evidenced by
expressions of consensus in international documents and by multilateral
international bodies.128 This means that widespread agreement to a treaty
condemning the practice of state-sponsored economic espionage combined with
an extensive cessation of state-sponsored economic espionage would establish a
general principle of law that courts could enforce even against non-signatories to
the treaty.
This solution focuses on the long game and will likely need to be
addressed in the future. Presently, the threat of state-sponsored economic
espionage lingers and escalates, requiring direct action to ensure that the threat
does not continue to grow. Domestic remedies are incapable of curtailing
economic espionage when sponsored by a country, meaning that international
remedies are necessary. A treaty is the best way to achieve this because it allows
for countries to act of their own accord. A treaty would also rest in the theory of
reciprocity to create a balance of obligation where each country is responsible
for upholding its own responsibilities and for maintaining a system in which
other countries will continue to maintain theirs as well. If the practice of statesponsored economic espionage is not to continue to pervade the national and
economic security of the United States, action is needed on the international
stage. An international, multilateral treaty is precisely the type of action that
could effectively eradicate the use of state-sponsored economic espionage.
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